Following two decades of fruitless pre-accession activities, the EU is losing credibility in the Western Balkan countries, making it an imperative to find solutions that tangibly advance the Union’s enlargement policy. This September’s report of the Franco-German expert group could represent a positive step in that direction
I sometimes wonder whether it’s even possible to be a Serbian patriot and not to love France, or to be French patriot while opposing the Serbs? A special bond was forged between the two countries and peoples in the first half of the 19th century. After the restoration of Serbian statehood, the country sent its top cadets to French universities, thereby gaining a national elite that would go on to create one of the most progressive, democratic states in the Europe of the early 20th century. Fighting side by side in the trenches of the Great War, Serbian and French soldiers quickly established a relationship of brotherhood and solidarity, despite speaking different languages.
Thousands of Serbian children were also saved from the maelstrom of war and educated at French primary and secondary schools. During World War II, General Dragoljub ‘Draža’ Mihajlović, leader of one of the two resistance movements in the then occupied Kingdom of Yugoslavia, maintained close relations with the leader of the Free French forces, General Charles de Gaulle. During the post-war period, members of the Serbian community contributed to redeveloping the French economy, while Serbian artists created their works in France, or with French encouragement and support.
France and Serbia are today connected by new political challenges, and Serbia primarily desires to join France in the EU. Following two decades of fruitless pre-accession activities, the European Union is losing credibility among the citizens of Western Balkan countries. That’s why it’s necessary to find solutions that tangibly advance the Union’s enlargement policy. This September’s report of the Franco-German expert group, which received the support of ministers for European integration, could represent a positive step in that direction. It should be noted that difficulties in the functioning of the EU’s institutional system ensure that it isn’t able to receive a larger number of new member states simultaneously.
For France, due to historical and political reasons, Serbia is a key partner on the territory of the former Yugoslavia
Furthermore, current candidate countries find themselves at different stages of European integration and economic development. As such, the Franco-German idea of applying the regatta principle would represent an appropriate response. It is my consideration that Serbia and Montenegro, as the countries that have advanced the most in accession negotiations, should be accepted as members by 2030. The Union would thus send a clear signal validating its pre-accession policy. In the meantime, it is necessary to enable these two countries, but also other candidate countries, to be included in EU programmes in stages and to receive the same funding from the pre-accession funds as existing member states.
Viewed from a Serbian perspective, the Franco-German plan for Kosovo includes two compromise solutions and several others that would be difficult to implement. Firstly, the establishment of the Community of Serb Municipalities (ZSO) offers partial implementation of the 2013 Brussels Agreement for the ethnic Serb community in Kosovo. Unfortunately, the powers and responsibilities of the ZSO, as envisaged in the original text of the agreement, are being brought into question. Serbia will not be obliged to formally recognise the independence of Kosovo in the period ahead and, in return, will recognise Kosovo’s formal documents (passports, identity cards, stamps/seals), agree for Kosovo to appear at international summits without the star indicating that it is a territory under UN protection and allow Kosovo to become a member of international organisations. These demands will shake the very foundations of Serbian foreign policy.