When it comes to a specific timeframe for the accession of Western Balkan countries, it is realistic to assume this will be a process that unfolds in stages, given candidate countries’ capacities
The Ukraine crisis opened a new chapter in geopolitical relations, which has certainly been reflected in the EU enlargement process. It is today clearer than ever that the Western Balkan region must maintain strong ties with the Union. Enlargement to encompass the Western Balkans has primarily become an issue with security implications for the EU, and has thus recreated the conditions to restore credibility to a process that has been in question for several years.
This, on the one hand, was a consequence of the unwillingness of candidate countries to truly get to grips with essential reforms, while on the other hand it reflects the unwillingness of the European Union to monitor these processes consistently, due to a lack of political consensus on enlargement and the need for internal EU reforms. In Serbia, this situation, coupled with the constant strengthening of soft Russian influence via different figures in society, has led to a significant increase in Euroscepticism, which has created space to further promote anti-European perspectives in the political sphere. Only the aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated possible long-term consequences of these processes for the region as a whole, and thus also for the Union itself.
Even though the European integration process could speed up significantly, candidate countries must still fulfil all set obligations
Accordingly, we have seen the intensifying of numerous processes which have the role of, on the one hand, restoring confidence within candidate countries regarding the seriousness of the EU’s enlargement intentions, while on the other hand their role is to motivate the speeding up of reform processes without which there can be no progress on accession. When it comes to the specific timeframe that’s currently on the table, it should also be viewed in the context of the EU’s recent Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, which was presented by EC President Ursula von der Leyen. Phased accession is probably a realistic plan, given the current capacities of the candidate countries, while it simultaneously also reflects a clear political intention to pursue enlargement, around which there is consensus among all member states.
However, from the perspective of obligations, this changes almost nothing for us, because one of the four pillars of the aforementioned Plan is still related to reforms and progress, especially within the framework of political criteria and the rule of law, which are areas where Serbia has received the harshest criticisms. The difference lies in the fact that institutions and citizens could now feel some tangible benefits long before the concluding of the accession process, such as, for example, access to the European single market or funds which, in previous rounds of enlargement, only became available with formal membership status. Experiences from previous enlargement rounds showed that there must be no turning a blind eye in these most sensitive areas, such as the rule of law and the struggle to curb corruption and fight crime, as this would threaten the fundamental values of the EU that set it apart from all other political alliances, now or at any previous time in history.
