Growing awareness of the importance of preventing a malign Russian influence in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans is progressively convincing EU stakeholders that tangible incentives need to be offered to EU candidate countries on their path to membership
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine poses the greatest threat to European security since WWII, prompting the EU’s political elites to recognise that enlargement is the best way to secure the EU’s position in the parts of Europe that remain beyond the Union’s borders. The most visible change in terms of enlargement policy was the inclusion of three Eastern European countries in that process with the granting of candidate country status to Ukraine and Moldova, as well as offering broader European prospects to Georgia. The EU also exerted substantial efforts to overcome the obstacles hindering the opening of accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia, as well as granting candidate country status to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, EU leaders have also acknowledged that the EU should prepare itself institutionally for the next round of enlargement.
By explicitly mentioning 2030 as a potential year for EU enlargement, the President of the European Council broke a long-standing EU taboo. At the same time, the European Commission continues to back the stance that the accession process must remain merit- based, and thus any promised dates are contingent upon the fulfilment of necessary reforms. In that context, promising a date can be viewed as superfluous and arbitrary. However, the European Policy Centre believes that these two views are far more complementary than they initially appear.
Setting a target year for the next round of enlargement might prove a crucial booster for reforms on the ground and trigger a much more dynamic accession process among candidate countries’ governments
Namely, predictability and credibility, as key values of the accession process, can only be achieved if the process is fully merit-based and if accession countries are being gradually rewarded for their improvements in the process. However, at the same time, these two values of the enlargement process could be seriously undermined if there is no indicative timeframe that would serve to motivate candidate countries to remain committed to the reform process, which will eventually result in them joining the EU, provided the required level of preparedness is reached by a mutually agreed date. In that context, the proposed target year should be viewed as a target towards which both sides (the candidate countries and the EU) should work together, rather than as a promised date of accession for any candidate country.
Membership in the EU requires that aspiring countries fully align with the EU acquis, prepare to compete on the EU’s Single Market and duly strengthen their public administration to handle this important step. Considering this long list and how difficult it has proven to be for Western Balkan countries that are already 20 years into the integration process, the road will most certainly be challenging for Ukraine and other Eastern European countries. In that context, the 2030 target sounds quite optimistic as a timeline for completing all the necessary reforms, especially given the ongoing war and all the devastation it is bringing to Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukraine last year managed to answer the Commission’s questionnaire in record time and secure candidate country status quicker than anyone expected. This certainly constitutes a basis for optimism.
